The theory of auction was first formalized by William Vickery. His classical contribution was one of the standards in the Game theory and it is contained in standard textbooks. This is an auction in which the highest bidder wins but pays only the second-highest bid. This variation over the normal bidding procedure is supposed to encourage bidders to bid the largest amount they are willing to pay. Optimization of payoff strategy for Vickery auction can be programed using game theory and computer algebra systems, as it is presented in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
In 1994 the United States government adopted an auction in selling the right on the radio frequency for pager service providers. Since then the governments all over the world have adopted auctions in selling the newly invented rights for the private corporations. e theory of auction was rst formalized by William Vickery in 1961. In his original work on auction theory, William Vickrey pointed out several types of auctions used in practice [1] . His classical contribution is one of the standards in the Game theory. Applying game theory to the study of auctions, Vickrey showed that some auctions are strategically equivalent and how to compute Nash equilibrium bid strategy for bidders [2] . e terms Vickrey auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction are equivalent and used interchangeably. e Vickrey auction has been widely advocated for multi-agent systems [3] . eBay's system of proxy bidding is similar to Vickrey auction. A variant of a Vickrey auction, named generalized second-price auction, is used in Google's and Yahoo!'s online advertisement programs [4] , [5] . ere were attempts to construct the payo matrix for two and more player game by simulation approach, and to show that the weak dominance holds for the second price auction [6] .
Papers written on auctions are usually described using mathematical notation [7] , and are not applicable for practical usage. e main purpose of this paper is to show that programming of auctions is not di cult using Computer Algebra Systems (CAS) [8] . Even more, inexperienced user can use preprogramed code for simple analysis and optimization.
COMPUTER ALGEBRA SYSTEMS Computer Algebra System Features
A computer algebra system is a so ware program that allows computing with mathematical expressions in a way which is similar to the traditional handwritten computations of the mathematicians and other scientists. Wolfram Research brought into the mainstream the original soware Mathematica in 1988 as the rst computer algebra system [8] . e main computer algebra system features are: symbolic handling of arbitrary formulas, exact and arbitrary-precision arithmetic, symbolic expansion, factoring, simpli cation and substitution, symbolic integration, di erentiation, summation, limits and series, symbolic solvers for systems of equations, di erential equations, and di erence equations, full support of elementary and special functions, exact and symbolic matrix operations. e so ware is integrated with MathWorld's encyclopedic website of mathematical information. ousands of ready-built interactive demonstrations of mathematical concepts can be used as starting point for speci c applications. Web interface is provided using webMathematica. Some other so ware companies o er valuable CAS solutions. Maxima is a descendant of Macsyma, the legendary computer algebra system developed in the late 1960s at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Texas Instruments came with a computer algebra system based on Derive, and was one of the rst calculators to o er 3D graphing. MuPAD is a computer algebra system that was purchased by MathWorks and the MuPAD code was included in the Symbolic Math Toolbox add-on for MATLAB. Maple is a commercial computer algebra system developed and sold commercially by Mapleso .
Financial Engineering with Mathematica
An extraordinary encyclopedia of option pricing techniques is presented in [9] . Authors from the Hebrew University have published several articles in Mathematica in Education and Research. Much of this material had its origins in courses on nancial engineering [10] .
In some papers it is described a step-by-step procedure for developing code for some economic functions. It starts with the simplest case and the user can add new more complicated features, such as more players in the auction game simulation [6] . is can be confusing for inexperience users. Actually, some very complex procedures can be programmed with just a few code lines using powerful built-in CAS functions, as it is presented in this paper.
Mathematica has fully integrated support for many of the tools used in classical and modern nance. ese capabilities include nancial instrument valuation (FinancialDerivative, FinancialBond), advanced time value of money computations (TimeValue, Cash ow, E ectiveInterest, AnnuityDue, Annuity), and advanced nancial charting with a library of technical indicators (InteractiveTradingChart, TradingChart, CandlestickChart). Mathematica also provides immediate access to a large array of nancial and economic data, and contains nancial import and export tools for working with external data. More information on the Vickery auction and game theory is provided by Wolfram Alpha.
Knowledge based system and applications using CAS
Many researchers start their work by studying theory in order to get better insight into observed phenomena. Sometimes they cannot get the numeric values of parameters presented in the published reports. is is even more complicated when the theory is statistical and there are no closed form deterministic solutions. An original approach and method to analyzing mathematically written papers, such as Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm is presented in [11] .
An original algorithm that combines design and synthesis step, using computer algebra system, with the optimization for targeted implementation technology is presented in [12] . e approximation step is based on Gegenbauer polynomial and the corresponding cost function. e knowledge, in the form of mathematical expressions, is typed into CAS and therea er is automatically performed optimization using speci ed criteria.
e straightforward procedure for the design and analysis of uniform and nonuniform digital systems based on approximately linear phase IIR lters and frequency response masking technique (FRM) are derived using CAS [13] .
e same approach can be used for developing any algorithm, such as the aeronautical communication system that have to provide more communications capacity and to increase capabilities [14] . e improvements are necessary to be able to cope with the expected air tra c growth in future. e main idea is to automate the design procedure starting from the block diagram of the system and carrying out the implementation code on the target hardware. e role and importance of symbolic computation in communication systems is exempli ed on OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing). e development tools are Mathematica, and application soware SchematicSolver [15] .
e market for telecommunications networks and services is constantly changing. So is the regulatory approach. Technological progress creates new challenges for the creation of a level playing eld between traditional and new operators and service providers. CAS can be used to analyze and develop new applications and services that can be more robust to economic impacts [16] .
ALGORITHM OF VICKERY AUCTION
In this paper we will use algorithm described in [6] . Vickery auction is the second price auction, in which the winner is the highest bidder, while the winner pays the second highest bid price to acquire the object. e true valuations of the object are denoted by v i , and this value can be di erent for di erent i bidders. e strategy sets are s i ∈ S i = {10, 20, ..., 10n i }, where 10<v i <10 n i . When player A1 selects a strategy, s 1 and player A2 selects a strategy s 2 from the set S i , and s 1 >s 2 , player A1 is the winner, and A1 pays s 2 to acquire the object. In that case, the payo of player A1 is p 1 =v 1 -s 2 and the second payo is p 2 =0.
Suppose that v 1 =40 and v 2 =20, and the bidding is selected from the strategy sets s 1 =60, and s 2 =50. e winner is A1 because s 1 >s 2 , and the payo s are p 1 =40-50=-10, and p 2 =0. Obviously, player A1 pays 10 more than the true value for player A1.
In another case, v 1 =40 and v 2 =20, and the bidding is selected from the set s 1 =60, and s 2 =30. e winner is A1 because s 1 >s 2 , and the payo s are p 1 =40-30=10, and p 2 =0.
e player A1 pays 10 less than his true value. Suppose that v 1 =40 and v 2 =20, and the bidding is selected from the strategy sets s 1 =20, and s 2 =30. e winner is A2 because s 2 >s 1 , and the payo s are p 1 =0 and p 2 =20-20=0. e player A1 loses this time.
e strategy of bidding with lower value than the true value is better because the payo is larger, but the prob-ability to win is much lower. e strategy of bidding with highest value than the true value is better because it is more promising to win, but the payo can be lower and even negative -paying more than the true value. e special case is when two or more bidders have the same strategy value that is the largest value, for example s 1 =s 2 . In this case, the winner is selected by lottery, so that the probability for each player becomes the winner is 1/2. If the winner is player A1, A1 pays s 1 =s 2 to acquire the object, and the payo of player A1 is the expected value, p 1 =(v 1 -s 1 )/2, while the second player A2 has the expected value p 2 =(v 2 -s 2 )/2.
Suppose that v 1 =40 and v 2 =20, and the bidding is selected from the strategy sets s 1 =30, and s 2 =30. e winner can be A1 or A2 because s 1 =s 2 , and the payo s are p 1 =(40-30)/2=5, and p 2 =(20-30)/2=-5. Obviously, payo of player A1 is positive, while payo of the second player is negative; A2 pays more than his true value.
In this paper we are describing how to program and play this auction in an attempt to determine the optimal bidding strategy with the highest payo .
PROGRAMMING WITH MATHEMATICA
e code for calculating the payo is de ned as a function, payo Vickery, that has two arguments, the true valuations of the object vABCD, and the bidding prices sABCD, where arguments are matrices. e length of matrices is equal to the number of bidders. is means that the presented code works for arbitrary number of players, where the minimal number of players is 2. e command Ordering sorts all values. e number of equal largest bidds is stored in nABCD. e two largest bidds are computed as lABCD. e payo is calculated using Do loop, only for largest bids. e auctioneer wants to sell and get the highest possible payment; this can be computed in a similar manner using another function, eVickery. Another important function is de ned for computing random value for each player from the set of preferred strategies, sRandomInteger. is is the only knowledge that describes the Vickery auction. Once stored in the CAS, the knowledge can be used for computing any single auction, or a number of auctions with di erent strategies based on arbitrary probabilities. In order to prevent errors of inexperience user, the help and test instructions can be added in a similar way as in [15] .
It is important to notice that the simplicity of the code is due to the powerful built-in functions of CAS, and the newly de ned functions for auction can be used as they are built-in. e new knowledge can be put at the beginning of working notebook, or it can be stored as an additional knowledge in a package that can be inputted into CAS by a simple input command.
USING THE KNOWLEDGE FOR OPTIMIZATION
e code for di erent number of cases can be obtained by iterative evaluation of the de ned functions for all possible values of strategies, say for i from the range -2 to 5. In this case, all possible strategies are i ∈ {-2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, where the corresponding bidding prices are 10i. It is interesting to notice that the random value is generated using the command Map.
Map[sRandomInteger[vABCD[[#]],xABCD[[#]]] &,
In order to make sure we get the same sequence of pseudorandom numbers on di erent occasions, the command SeedRandom[n] resets the pseudorandom generator, using n as a seed.
As an example, we can evaluate 40 000 iterations for randomly generated bidding prices with uniform distribution, with expected true values v 1 =60, v 2 =30, v 3 =50, v 4 =20, and v 5 =40, that is de ned as vABCD={60,30,50,20,40}. e di erent strategies are de ned only for the rst bidder i ∈ {-2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, that is s 1max = v 1 +10i, or from the set of maximal bidding prices s 1max ∈ {40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110}. For all other bidders, the strategy is to have only one value, s 2max =30+10=40, s 3max =50+20=70, s 4max =20, s 5max =30.
e actual bidding price is randomly selected from the range 10≤ s i ≤s i max , with the discrete uniform distribution. Fig. 1 shows that payo of the bidder with the highest true value v 1 increases with higher s 1max . e payo of the bidder with the second highest true value v 3 decreases with higher s 1max . For the bidder with the highest true value v 1 , the ratio of the payo and the true value has a maximum for the strategy 0, that is s 1max = v 1 , as it is presented in Fig. 2 . is can lead to a conclusion that the highest bid should not be larger than the true value that is an auction without a risk.
For the bidder with the second highest true value v 3 , the ratio of the payo and the true value is a decreasing function for higher s 1max , as it is presented in Fig. 3 .
Let us de ne the di erence of payo s between two consecutive strategies, Δp(Strategy S i ) = p(Strategy S i ) -p(Strategy S i-1 ) (1) Fig. 3 . Ratio of p 3/ s 3 for di erent strategies S 1 . Fig. 4 illustrates that strategy 2 is probably the optimal because the strategy 3 and 4 are more risky and without considerably increased payo s. e payment e of the auctioneer is also increasing function when bidders take a highest risk, and the expected payment is presented in Fig. 5 . A er determining the strategy for the bidder with the highest true value, the procedure can be repeated for all other players. Even more, the same program can be used for di erent expected true values of each bidder, and the best strategy can be selected as the most preferable solution. It should be noticed that the bidding price is randomly generated and that strategy determines the highest value of the strategy set.
CONCLUSION
e Vickery auction for arbitrary number of players can be easily programed using powerful commands of computer algebra systems. Assuming di erent strategies of players with the expected true values, the optimal strategy can be easily computed for di erent bidding prices.
